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Controversy spaces. The dialectical nature of 
change in the sciences and philosophy 
 
 
O SCA R NUD LE R  
 
 
 
RES UM EN : The paper outlines the model of controversy spaces. The model of 
controversy spaces integrates two different elements of the dialectical tradition. On the 
one hand, dialectics in its ancient meaning: the practice of controversial dialogue. On 
the other hand, the model incorporates dialectics understood as a pattern of change 
in intellectual history, based on the confrontation between opposite standpoints. I will 
be argued in this paper, the dialectical tradition was almost completely left aside in 
modernity and substituted by a monolectic approach. The model that will be outlined 
below aims at overcoming this view by focusing on the emergence, development and 
transformation of controversy spaces. 
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Wittgenstein. 
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What role do controversies play in the advancement of philosophical 
understanding and the progress of scientific knowledge? In both cases, from 
the beginnings of modern philosophy, the prevailing responses have been 
skeptical of such a possible role. At best, it is granted that controversies may 
occasionally be beneficial, although their value would hardly be more than 
anecdotal. At worst, they are regarded as a clear sign of the deplorable state 
of the respective field of inquiry, especially when they continue indefinitely 
without reaching any consensus, as so often happens in philosophy. 
This view began to change only in the second half of last century. A 
growing corpus of literature has contributed to the reevaluation of the 
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cognitive significance of controversies. According to this perspective, whose 
origins can be traced to the ancient Sophists, the progress of knowledge has 
an essentially controversial or dialectical nature. However, dialectics, in the 
sense of “adversarial dialogue”, has not yet become a widely accepted 
alternative to the monolectic view adopted by early modern philosophers. 
One of the main reasons behind this limitation is a hidden assumption 
according to which controversies may be approached as specific, isolated 
phenomena. However, at least in most cases any controversy is embedded 
from its very start in a network of relationships with other controversies. 
Therefore, a unit of analysis larger than “controversy” is badly needed in 
intellectual history. In the same way that units larger in scope than “theory” 
—such as “paradigm”, “research programme”, “research tradition”, etc— 
have been useful in bringing to light new aspects of the dynamics of 
scientific change, I am persuaded that the introduction of “controversy 
space” as a unit of analysis wider than “controversy” will have the same 
effect. This new notion would turn the dialectical approach into an effective 
tool for reconstructing the intellectual history of entire fields, not just of 
isolated episodes. 
Before turning in the fourth section of this essay to the concept of 
“controversy space” and its related notions, we should first ask why a new 
model of scientific and philosophical change is needed at all. In order to 
answer, I shall sketch and assess in the next two sections the main positions 
that have been held on the problem of the epistemic status of controversies. 
I will start with scientific controversies and take up later philosophical ones. 
Some wellknown debates have been the inspiring source of the model 
that is introduced and illustrated in this book. The fi st is the confrontation 
between “classical” and “new” philosophers of science that reached its peak 
in the 60’s and 70’s (see Nudler 2004). The controversy spaces model offers 
an alternative answer to some of the main issues at stake in that debate; for 
instance, whether the progress of scientific knowledge takes the form of a 
continuous ascending line or moves through revolutionary leaps that give 
rise to epistemic gaps. The second source of this model has been the 
confrontation between metaphilosophical views on the possibility of 
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progress in philosophy. Here, the main disagreement is between those who 
deny the possibility of philosophical progress (or admit, at best, a sort of 
negative progress consisting in the dissolution of philosophical problems) 
and those who assert that philosophical progress is possible only if the 
“right” philosophical method is applied. 
 
S C I E N T I FI C  C O N T R OV ER S I ES :  T W O OP P OS ED  M OD EL S  
 
As has been just mentioned, the view that has prevailed since the beginning 
of modernity is that controversies play no significant role in the 
development of science. For early modern philosophers such as Descartes or 
Bacon, science is essentially a twoplayer game (cf. Machamer, Pera, and 
Baltas 2000): the inquiring mind on one side and nature on the other; the 
former asking questions and the latter “answering” them. Bacon claimed 
that the task of the scientific researcher is not to argue with others but to 
interrogate nature following the right method, and Descartes argued in the 
same direction. This negative attitude towards dialectics was indeed a 
reaction against its previous abuse in late scholasticism, yet it would persist 
largely unchallenged over the next three centuries. Both Descartes and 
Bacon believed that a universal, context–free Method is the only key to 
gaining knowledge. For Bacon, intelligence and imagination devoid of 
method are not only useless but also dangerous: “The understanding must 
not therefore be supplied with wings, but rather hung with weights, to keep 
it from leaping and flying” (Bacon 1863, p. 138). Descartes says something 
very similar at the beginning of his Discourse: “The greatest minds, as they 
are capable of the highest excellencies, are open likewise to the greatest 
aberrations; and those who travel very slowly may yet make far greater 
progress, provided they keep always to the straight road.” (Descartes 2006, 
p. 1). 
A consequence of this methodological (or, more precisely, 
methodologist) stance is that controversies should not even arise. If the 
available information is sufficient to solve a problem, there is no room for 
disagreement and, therefore, for controversies. And if the available 
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information is not sufficient, instead of quarreling about conjectures what is 
needed is more information. However, if a controversy does nevertheless 
arise, a widely shared assumption was that the scientific method would 
provide a secure way to put an end to it by submitting rival theories to the 
verdict of nature, when possible through an experimentum crucis. Though 
under more sophisticated clothes, the hard core of this methodologist and 
monolectic approach remained essentially unchanged throughout the 
development of the philosophy of science in the first half of the 20th 
century. 
In sharp contrast to this modern negative attitude toward controversies, 
dialectics was highly appreciated in classical Greece. This is apparent not 
only in the dialogues written by Plato but also in a vast literature in the form 
of adversarial dialogue that, according to fragments and references to it that 
survived, flourished along the fourth century in Athens. Plato, for all his 
love of mathematics, regarded dialectics as being superior to it in the 
hierarchy of knowledge. Aristotle also esteemed dialectics, though he did 
not consider it an adequate tool for science. For him, dialectics is the art of 
reasoning from premises that are the accepted opinions of experts (endoxa) 
in a given field. Thus, while endoxa are accepted on authority, scientific 
reasoning departs from first principles that are “convincing on the strength 
not of anything else but of themselves” (Topics Book I, 100a, 30–31). Thus 
the truth of principles is immediate and, therefore, superior to endoxa, 
whose truth is not immediate but established as the result of a dialectical 
procedure. 
In Book VIII of the Topics, Aristotle describes this dialectical procedure 
as follows: one of the parties in the dialogue aims at persuading the other to 
accept a thesis, while the other party tries to avoid to be rationally compelled 
to do so; to achieve his purpose, the first party seeks the agreement of the 
second to propositions from which his thesis can be deduced. If a 
proposition is accepted in this way, it is probably, though not necessarily, 
true because it is not accepted at face value but granted as a result of a 
dialectical exchange. We may conclude that, while Aristotle appreciated and 
contributed to the development of dialectics, his conception of science was a 
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forerunner of the modern monolectic view; in fact, Aristotle declared that 
solitary research is less prone to deceit than research with others: 
 
[...] the error is effected the more readily when we are inquiring into a problem in 
company with others than when we do so by ourselves (for an inquiry with another 
person is carried on by means of speech, whereas an inquiry by oneself is carried on 
quite as much by means of the object itself) (Sophistici Elenchi 169a, 37–41). 
 
In the Middle Ages, the dialectical tradition incorporated a new element 
inspired in Roman rules for judiciary processes. Thus, a medieval disputatio 
was a sort of trial in which the “proponent” of a thesis faced an “opponent”, 
in the presence of an audience, and under the authority of a magister who at 
the end of the debate recapitulated the essential points and pronounced his 
verdict. The procedure had to follow a set of elaborate rules, such as those 
concerning the burden of proof (onus probandi). Rescher (1977) made the 
interesting suggestion that medieval disputatio may be taken as a model for 
the process leading to the acceptance or rejection of a new hypothesis by a 
scientific community. When a scientist proposes a hypothesis (the 
“proponent”), the respective community provides one or more opponents 
who challenge it in order to expose its weaknesses and preclude its 
acceptance. Finally, the community, playing the role of the arbiter in a 
disputatio, decides whether to accept or reject the proposed hypothesis. 
As is well known, after the modern decline of dialectics, Hegel recovered 
it as a central concept, though endowing it with a new meaning. Besides the 
traditional meaning, exclusively related to language and argument, Hegelian 
idealism introduced an ontological or metaphysical sense of dialectics as a 
law of development of reality. Though leaving aside this allen–compassing 
scope of the Hegelian sense, we will use the term in a sense inspired by it; 
namely, dialectics as applied to processes of change in intellectual history. It 
is in this sense that episodes in the history of science and philosophy (when 
understood as processes of creation, development, transformation, and 
disappearance of controversy spaces) may be dubbed dialectic. 
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As has been mentioned, the modern rejection of dialectic was associated 
with a methodologist view of the advancement of knowledge. It was not 
until the late fifties that methodologism began to be seriously challenged. N. 
R. Hanson, P. Feyerabend, T. S. Kuhn, and S. Toulmin questioned the 
entrenched belief in a universal, context–free scientific method as the key to 
explain the progress of scientific knowledge. In contrast to this view, the 
new philosophers of science stressed the changing, historically conditioned 
character of scientific method as well as the theory–laden nature of scientific 
observation and its language (Hanson 1958). Kuhn, in turn, emphasized the 
dependence of epistemic standards on value priorities that may vary from 
one scientific community to another. 
However, all these criticisms of methodologism were not accompanied 
(with the possible exception of Feyerabend) by a full recognition of the 
cognitive role of dialectics. Kuhn, for instance, did not assign any substantial 
role to controversies, neither in what he called the normal phases in the 
history of science nor in its revolutionary phases. In the former, because the 
paradigm is not subject to debate, only to further articulation and 
application; and in the latter because incommensurability between the new 
and the old paradigm prevents genuine controversies to arise. Only in the 
phase of crisis, as well as in the prescientific stage, Kuhn admits that 
controversies may play a role. Nevertheless, it is not clear what epistemic 
impact, if any, he assigns to them. Laudan (1977), on the contrary, proposed 
a model that highlights the role of different types of disagreements. 
However, his model places so much emphasis on the purely rational 
character of disagreements leading to epistemic progress that, in my view, 
most real scientific controversies fall outside its scope. As will be argued 
later, controversies, also in science, include not only rational ingredients but 
non–rational ones as well. 
Especially thanks to the influential contribution of Dascal (1995, 1996a, 
1996b, 2006) and other scholars (such as Engelhardt 1987, Pera 1991, and 
Fuller 1996), the epistemic role of controversies in the history of science 
began to be clearly recognized and systematically scrutinized. However, as 
suggested before, most of this work focuses on single, relatively isolated 
CONTROVERSY SPACES | 7 
 
 
controversies, thus failing, despite all its usefulness for the study of concrete 
episodes, to provide a framework to study the historical transformations of 
science at a larger, more comprehensive scale. 
Other fields of inquiry in which the cognitive importance of 
controversies have also been stressed are the sociology of scientific 
knowledge and the social studies of science and technology. From the 
dominant perspective in these fields, the dynamics of scientific controversies 
is comparable to other types of controversies, particularly political ones. 
According to this sociologist approach, controversies in science come to an 
end not through the application of logical or rational standards but through 
a process of negotiation in which the accumulation of power, prestige and 
authority plays a decisive role. As is well known, this way of describing 
decision–making in science has been sharply criticized both by orthodox 
and historicist philosophers of science, including Kuhn. Although the so–
called “science wars” were especially intense in the 80’s, the fire has not 
entirely died out yet, as exemplified by Boghossian’s recent book 
(Boghossian 2006). 
Critics of sociological externalism often assume that controversies in 
science are, from the point of view of their rationality, of one and only one 
kind. Depending on the side of the divide, debates are regarded either as 
rational, and therefore scientific, or non–rational, and therefore not 
scientific. But such a naïve dichotomy leaves room for a more complex 
distinction as soon as we realize that several types of scientific controversies 
may be distinguished, depending on their particular combination of rational 
and non–rational ingredients. Rather than divided into clear–cut 
compartments, controversies are distributed over a continuum between two 
purely ideal extremes, namely, at one end, a “rational” pole in which 
controversies supposelly develop according to purely rational, internal 
standards, and, at the other end, a non–rational (or even irrational) pole 
where the development and outcome of controversies would be exclusively 
based on external factors such as the interests and relative power of the 
parties. We consider such opposite poles as ideal because real controversies, 
no matter how close they might be to either one of these poles, never 
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coincide totally with any of them. Of course, this does not imply denying 
that there are controversies whose development and resolution may be 
accounted for using almost exclusively rational epistemic standards (e.g., the 
controversies over the existence of the ether, the particle or wave nature of 
light, the continental drift), as well as controversies in which non–rational, 
extra–epistemic elements play a decisive role (e.g., the controversies 
between the Copernican and the Aristotelian cosmologies in the 17th 
century, between evolutionists and creationists in the 19th century, and 
between behaviorism and psychoanalysis in the 20th century). However, 
though the dosis of rationality and non–rationality in controversies may 
widely vary, no component is totally absent. Accordingly, the term 
“controversy”, as it is used here, does not apply to possible cases in which 
pure rationality or, conversely, pure irrationality, is the rule. I have proposed 
the term “primitive conflict” to name this latter case (Nudler 1990). 
A controversy does not necessarily remain at the same point of the 
mentioned continuum throughout its whole historical trajectory. Thus, 
there are many cases in which a controversy was initially close to the 
rational pole but later its nature changed so as to become closer to the non–
rational end of the spectrum. A clear example in this connection is what 
happened before and after the intervention of Galileo, about seventy years 
after the publication of Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus, in the controversy 
between the Copernican and the Ptolemaic views of the planetary system 
(Blackwell 1991). An interesting, current example of this kind of change is 
the controversy around the potential risks that genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) might pose to human health. In the first phase, prior to 
the actual use of GMOs in crops, the controversy was confined to the 
community of molecular biologists. This phase ended when scientists 
reached an agreement at the Asilomar conference of 1975, which produced 
a report describing security protocols that would, allegedly, ensure the safe 
use of GMs. However, a bit later, ecologists began to intervene in the 
controversy. Their objection to molecular biologists was that their results 
were exclusively based on laboratory studies that did not take into account 
the potential risks of introducing GMOs into the environment. Now, when 
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GM seeds began to be used in cultivation on a large scale, new actors from 
outside the scientific community began to play an active role, namely, 
multinational companies supplying GM seeds, environmental groups, 
politicians, mass media, and public opinion. It is clear that as new voices 
made themselves heard, the controversy shifted from one place near the 
rational pole to another close to the non–rational pole of the rational/non–
rational continuum. It could be objected that, in this way of reconstructing 
the history of this controversy, it would be more appropriate to distinguish 
two different controversies: one involving only scientists and another in 
which extra–scientific actors intervene. However, in my view, it is more 
illuminating to reconstruct the course of the debate as parts of the same 
controversy space whose first stage already implicitly contained the 
elements that would shape its later character. Such an approach would alert 
us, from the very start of the heuristic process, to the potential social, 
political and cultural charge of a controversy. As T. Pinch y C. Leuenberger 
have pointed out: “[...] during a controversy the social dimensions of science 
normally hidden can become more explicit” (2006, p. 2). 
The power of controversies to reveal hidden dimensions, social or 
otherwise, is one of the main reasons to attribute a unique epistemic value to 
them. G. Freüdenthal has pointed out some of the ways in which 
controversies may bring about epistemic progress: “[...] in their search for 
the source of disagreement, the opponents move in the direction of 
foundations and also toward new consequences” (Freüdenthal 1998, p. 158). 
 
P H I L OS OP H I C A L  C ON T R O V E R S I ES :  S C A N D A L  OF  
R EA S O N ?  
 
A long tradition has denied philosophical controversies any epistemic 
potential. The ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics regarded philosophical 
controversies as useless from an epistemic point of view because there is no 
way to choose between the opposing positions. Worse than that, their only 
tangible result is the disturbance of inner peace so that the best we can do is 
to get rid of them. In modern times, philosophical controversies have also 
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been demoted with the argument that there is no method to put an end to 
them. That is why philosophical controversies proliferate. Descartes, the 
founder of modern philosophy, believed that we should leave traditional 
philosophical controversies aside and start from scratch using the new 
method he discovered, designed for the solitary thinker. 
The devaluation of controversies as a source of epistemic (and, more 
generally, intellectual) progress continued, and even increased, throughout 
modernity. Leibniz, for example, called for overcoming controversies and 
replacing them by a method that would allow the parties to “calculate”, 
instead of confronting each other, to resolve their disagreements (however, 
a different reading of Leibniz’s position regarding controversies is argued 
for in Dascal 2006). Kant, in the second preface to his Critique of Pure 
Reason, claimed that the state of perpetual disagreement (he took as a 
paradigmatic example the controversy about the existence of “things outside 
us”) is a “scandal of philosophy and of universal human reason” (Kant KRV, 
B XXXIX). 
It is worth mentioning here that Kant also rejected the skeptical attitude 
according to which philosophy (or, more precisely, metaphysics) does not 
admit, as a matter of principle, any method for resolving disagreements. 
Although agreeing with the rejection of traditional metaphysics as a form of 
knowledge, he nevertheless proposed a method capable of putting 
metaphysics “in the sure path of science”. Needless to say, such new 
metaphysics has nothing to do with the traditional one: it is transcendental, 
focused on the a priori conditions which make experience (and hence 
knowledge) possible, and not transcendent, inasmuch as it does not deal 
with non–empirical objects of speculative metaphysics. 
Though differing from the Kantian version, throughout the next two 
centuries this view of philosophy, either as a science or in an intimate 
relation with science, remained alive and well. An example of the first 
alternative is Husserl’s concept of philosophy as “strict science”. An example 
of the second is the positivist idea of a “scientific philosophy” whose 
objective is not to obtain knowledge about the world (a task reserved to 
empirical science) but to analyze the logical structure of scientific language. 
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A point in common among all the preceding approaches is the 
confidence in the virtues of method. The shared assumption is that by 
applying the correct method —whether transcendental, phenomenological, 
logical, pragmatic, or some other, depending on the philosopher’s loyalty— 
only legitimate philosophical problems would remain. By the same token, 
once the illegitimate problems are gone, they will carry along with them all 
the endless controversies they have generated.  
There have been various contemporary versions of what may be called 
the para–scientific view of philosophy, but perhaps none as extreme as that 
of W. O. Quine, who proposed to reduce epistemology —seen as the core 
component of philosophy— to an empirical science (Quine 1968). This 
extreme form of reductionism did not attract many followers; not even 
philosophers inspired by Quine’s naturalism, such as Kitcher (1992); but the 
idea of building philosophy taking science as a model is still widely shared. 
As is well known, however, many philosophers, including analytic 
philosophers, have rejected the belief in a close proximity between 
philosophy and science. The most radical among them have also rejected the 
possibility of reconstructing traditional philosophical problems with the 
argument that they are not, despite their appearance, legitimate problems. 
According to the author of the Tractatus, the reason for their illegitimacy is 
that the sentences that state them violate the rules endowing language with 
meaning and, as a consequence, are meaningless. According to the author of 
the Philosophical Investigations, their illegitimacy stems rather from their 
lack of roots in a form of life, a lack which manifests itself as grammatical 
confusion (in the Wittgensteinian sense of “grammar”). The only remaining 
task for the philosopher would be “to show the fly the way out of the bottle”, 
that is to say, to disclose the roots of grammatical confusion and thereby to 
dissolve pseudo–philosophical problems (Wittgenstein 1963, p. 309). 
Now, either by reconstructing philosophical problems or by dissolving 
them, it is clear that both views regard controversies around traditional 
philosophical problems as devoid of any positive epistemic potential. But 
this conclusion should be challenged. Taking a closer look at it, two of its 
assumptions are brought to the surface. The first is that all philosophical 
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controversies belong to just one type, namely, those that go on endlessly 
without reaching any consensus. The second is that such a permanent lack 
of consensus necessarily implies epistemic sterility. Let us examine the 
former assumption first. When diverse historical examples of philosophical 
controversies are analyzed and compared, quite significant differences 
among them, especially in what regards their conceptual and epistemic 
fruitfulness, are likely to pop up. There are controversies that certainly fit 
the negative stereotype, such as, generally speaking, late scholastic 
disputations. Controversies of this kind fail to generate innovations; they are 
unproductive in epistemic terms. Despite the intensity or vivacity they may 
exhibit, they remain in a state of conceptual stagnation or, even worse, 
conceptual blockage. They are unable to give rise, not only to new answers to 
old questions, but also to new questions. However, even a cursory look at 
the history of philosophy shows that this is not the only sort of philosophical 
controversies. Take, for example, the controversy among early modern 
philosophers who adopted mechanism and a mathematical conception of 
natural philosophy and contemporary Aristotelians, who remained attached 
to teleological explanation and a purely qualitative natural philosophy. In 
contrast to the stereotype, this controversy had no doubt an indirect though 
strong epistemic impact. As Alexander Koyré stressed, it paved the way to 
the rise of modern science. Actually, Koyré did not limit the influence of 
philosophy on science to the case of the rise of modern science: 
 
It is, indeed, my contention that the role of this “philosophic background” has always 
been of utmost importance, and that, in history, the influence of philosophy upon 
science has been as important as the influence –which everybody admits– of science 
upon philosophy (Koyré 1955, p. 107). 
 
While the universal scope of Koyré’s claim may be doubted, the impact of 
certain philosophical developments on science (as well as, of course, the 
impact of science on philosophy) is in some cases difficult to overestimate. 
But let us look at the problem of philosophical progress independently of 
the impact that philosophy may have on science or other fields. 
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Extrapolating Lakatos’ (1970) distinction between progressive and 
regressive scientific research programs, we will say that a controversy space 
is in a progressive phase if it generates new questions or discloses new 
aspects of existing subjects of inquiry. On the contrary, if a controversy 
space proved an obstacle to such developments, we will say that it is in a 
regressive phase. 
Russell (1918, p. 161) already pointed metaphorically to this form of 
progress attainable in philosophy when he attributed to it the power of 
enlarging our ideas (Nudler 2001). Rescher has described in detail what 
philosophical progress consists in for him: “In fact, philosophy progresses. 
Constant innovations supply new perspectives, new questions and 
problems, new and deeper arguments, subtler distinctions, systems more 
adequately developed, and so on” (Rescher 1985, p. 295). Turning to the 
second assumption that lies beneath the negative assessment of 
philosophical controversies —that persistent disagreement is incompatible 
with conceptual or intellectual progress—, the reasons invoked by Rescher 
are in my view enough to show that the contrary is true, i.e., that progress in 
philosophy is independent of the existence of consensus. 
 
T H E  M OD EL  O F  C ON T R OV ER S Y  S P A C ES  
 
In what follows, I will outline the model of controversy spaces in a rather 
abstract manner, just mentioning some examples in passing. The rest of this 
book will provide detailed, concrete examples of its application to the 
history of science and philosophy. 
A controversy space is a structure which usually has as elements, at any 
given point in time, some controversy which is central and other peripheral 
controversies related to it. However, since controversy spaces are highly 
dynamic structures, the relative positions of controversies with respect to 
each other may change so that a new controversy may become central. 
Despite these and other possible changes, the same controversy space 
continues to exist if there is some key element that remains stable. Such 
element is usually a problem, but sometimes it is just a theme. For example, 
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a main question in Aristotelian physics is why bodies move; but in inertial 
physics, from Galileo onwards, that question is substituted by another one: 
why bodies remain at rest, or change their speed while moving. Despite the 
fact that the central question changed, the controversy space remained the 
same because its theme – the explanation of the motion of bodies – 
continued to be the same. 
Quite rarely (perhaps never) controversies remain in a state of isolation 
for a long time. The fact is that controversies have a strong tendency to 
spread and associate with other controversies. As a first approximation, we 
could thus define controversy spaces as sets of interrelated controversies. 
For instance, already at its inception, the debate around Copernicanism and 
the introduction of a moving earth in the 16th and 17th centuries, was 
associated with the controversy on the absence of parallax of the fixed stars 
– which was also a controversy within astronomy. Likewise, Copernicanism 
was also associated from an early stage with controversies outside 
astronomy, especially the just mentioned controversy over the motion of 
bodies on earth, and even controversies completely outside the scope of 
natural philosophy, such as whether biblical passages should be interpreted 
literally or metaphorically. 
In principle, though the network of relationships established between 
controversies might potentially be extended indefinitely, in practice a 
controversy space consists, at any given moment of its historical trajectory, 
of all the controversies that are in fact interlinked at that moment. The 
extension of a controversy space —i.e., the number of controversies it 
contains— is therefore quite variable. Now, when the set of actually 
interrelated controversies is too large or heterogeneous, the historian is 
promtpted to make a pragmatic decision on where to put a limit to her 
research object. However, it could also happen that the historian may 
enlarge her research object when she finds that some relevant connections 
between controversies were not explicitly made by the parties actually 
involved. 
In contrast to the preliminary definition given before, controversy spaces 
are more than sets of interrelated controversies. A controversy space may 
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include not only controversies in the usual sense of the term but also what 
may be called fictional controversies. In this type of controversies, a party 
enters a debate with a dead or living opponent, imaginary or real, but who 
never actually intervenes. The importance of these fictional controversies for 
intellectual history has been often underestimated. However, in some cases, 
real and fictional controversies maintain a close relationship that, if 
neglected, would deprive us from understanding crucial aspects of the 
evolution of a given controversy space. It is not important, after all, whether 
“dialogues” of this kind are called controversies or not; what is important is 
to take them into account. It is worth quoting what M. Spranzi Zuber has to 
say in this regard: 
 
While a fictional dialogue erases, or reinterprets, the pragmatic aspects of a real 
dialectical exchange, it can help highlight its cognitive functions as well as the various 
strategies employed. While the idealized character of the fictional encounter eliminates 
the unpredictability and contingency of a real exchange, the constructed nature of the 
dialogue permits structural clarity and closure of the controversy it represents. Like 
rulebound disputations, dialogues are timecondensed, and therefore better reveal the 
backbone of what can be called a dialectic mode of inquiry (Spranzi Zuber 1998, p. 14). 
 
Spranzi Zuber also provides a clear illustration of the need to take into 
account fictional dialogues: the controversy between Galileo and the 
Aristotelian Francesco Ingoli on the motion of earth. This controversy was 
“real” only to a point, as Galileo did not address his response to Ingoli but to 
an unkown “lover of truth”. In 1616 Ingoli wrote a public letter in which he 
invited Galileo to a debate that would be conducted in the manner of a 
medieval disputatio, and in which Galileo would be urged to answer Ingoli’s 
objections to two main Copernican claims: that the earth occupies a central 
place in the universe, and that it is in motion. But Galileo only “answered” 
Ingoli’s letter in 1624. He had been waiting for a better climate to resume his 
defence of Copernican theory and, eight years after Ingoli’s letter, he 
thought the time was ripe for testing out the waters. His letter to Ingoli, 
distributed among some influential people, became the starting point of a 
process that led to the publication of the Dialogue in 1632, after finally 
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getting the nihil obstat from the Roman Church. As is well known, in this 
work, the Copernican theses are defended in detail against the criticisms of 
the Aristotelians. The Dialogue itself is a fictional controversy between 
Salviati, a supporter of the Copernican theory that supposedly represents 
Galileo, and Simplicio, an Aristotelian who criticizes it, while Sagredo plays 
the role of a learned moderator. On the first day of the Dialogue, Galileo 
clearly takes up again his response to Ingoli. This shows the continuity 
between the start of a real dialectical exchange and its end as a fictional one. 
The history of philosophy is of course full of examples of fictional 
controversies. To mention one contemporary example, the first part of 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations may be seen as a long fictional 
controversy between the author and an imaginary objector who defends a 
traditional conception of meaning called “Augustinian”. 
In addition to real and fictional controversies, two other central 
components of controversy spaces should be mentioned: (1) the problems 
around which the controversies revolve and (2) the theories, research 
programmes and traditions of inquiry in dialectical confrontation within the 
space. 
The structure of controversy spaces can be divided into two main 
regions, one explicit and the other implicit. All the elements mentioned thus 
far belong to the visible region: the focus of the controversy space. In turn, 
the invisible or mostly invisible region consists of the presuppositions or 
commitments not subject to discussion within the controversy space. The 
existence of such a set of underlying shared assumptions —large or small, 
but never empty— is a necessary condition for the existence of controversy 
spaces; otherwise, no controversies would be possible. In other words, there 
should be a basic agreement —a common ground— from which 
disagreements can emerge. In the absence of a common ground there may 
be conflict, even violent conflict (cf. Nudler 1990), or mutual indifference; 
but not controversy. Controversies are, thus, exchanges that require a tacit 
commitment of the participants to certain beliefs and rules. They may be 
methodological (for instance, what can count as possible evidence and what 
cannot) or metaphysical (such as the belief in the existence of natural laws 
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or, more specifically, their mechanical character). The common ground may 
also occasionally include a whole theory that would then have the status of a 
paradigm in Kuhn’s (1962) sense. 
There are dependency relationships among all the elements making up a 
controversy space, whether located at the focus or at the common ground. 
Such relationships are not symmetrical; for example, a theory change may 
have no impact on problems or assumptions; but, if any of the latter change, 
it would provoke significant theoretical changes. 
Let us look now more closely at the dynamics of controversy spaces, i.e., 
the ways in which they change. Not all components of controversy spaces 
change at the same pace. Thus, problems change at a much slower pace than 
the theories proposed to solve them, while some background assumptions 
may change even more slowly. Taking up once more the example of 
Copernican theory, it is well known that, while Copernicus abandoned the 
geocentric assumption of the Ptolemaic system, he left another assumption 
untouched; namely, the circularity of the orbits of celestial bodies. When 
one or more of the basic assumptions of a controversy space are brought to 
the surface and discussed in the respective community, this means that a 
structural change of the space has taken place. Such change consists in the 
translation of assumptions from the common ground to the focus. Thus I 
propose to call refocalization this kind of structural change. The case studies 
included in this book illustrate how this notion may contribute to the 
conceptual reconstruction of certain episodes in the history of diverse 
sciences, as well as in philosophy. A refocalization process often begins with 
the intervention in a controversy space of a third actor, a party who is not 
committed to any of the positions at stake, and who is therefore freer to 
propose a new perspective. Rather than continue playing the same game, she 
brings to the surface and challenges one or more of the assumptions that 
had been part of the common ground until that moment. If the challenge is 
accepted by the respective scientific or philosophical community (and it is 
not simply ignored or rejected without discussion), a new type of 
controversy begins that, using Kuhn’s term, may be called “extraordinary”, 
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in contrast to normal controversies that do not question the established 
common ground. 
The start of a refocalization process requires indeed innovation, 
sometimes even a bold creative leap. To this extent it is a phenomenon 
taking place at the level of individuals or small groups. However, since it 
also requires the community’s willingness to discuss the proposed 
refocalization, it is also a social phenomenon. Therefore, in the absence of 
such willingness, refocalization cannot take place. Intellectual history offers 
examples in which a proposed refocalization – even one that might have led, 
seen in retrospect, to a breakthrough – was available, but the respective 
community refused to consider it. Incidentally, this underlies the contingent 
nature of refocalization processes. 
Even in scientific and philosophical revolutions, the challenge and 
replacement of some basic assumptions coexists with the maintenance of 
other parts of the common ground. For example, when historicism 
appeared as a revolutionary alternative in the philosophy of science, 
questioning several assumptions of the existing common ground (such as 
the independence of observation with respect to theory), other assumptions 
remained untouched; for example that the key problem for philosophers of 
science is to determine the precise nature of the relationship between 
observation and theory. Only several years later, with the pragmatic turn, 
this latter assumption was also questioned. In fact, historical research shows 
that, at least in a significant number of cases, it is more fruitful to leave aside 
the heuristic assumption of a continuity/rupture dichotomy and replace it 
with a more nuanced combination of both. However, it would be a mistake 
to exclude a priori the possibility of cases in which, instead of 
transformation through refocalization, a controversy space is substituted by 
an entirely new one – that is, cases in which an established common ground 
is abandoned. For example, some of the scientists who created quantum 
mechanics saw it as the discovery of a “new world” in which almost all of the 
traditional assumptions of previous science did no longer hold. Another 
example is Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and his claim to have discovered 
the “new” realm of the Unconscious, in which the absence of logical laws, 
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time and causality require an entirely new approach. But, even in such 
episodes of deep change, the possibility of links with previous controversy 
spaces cannot be discarded. In any case, although the complete substitution 
of a controversy space by another is admitted, it is often the result of a 
process of successive refocalizations. 
Refocalization should not be seen as just a mechanical translation of 
some assumptions from the common ground to the focus of a controversy 
space. On the contrary, it implies the creation of new concepts or the 
redefinition of already available ones. The Copernican revolution, for 
example, redefined the concept of “planet”, which no longer meant a 
celestial body that revolves around the earth. The redefinition of “planet” as 
a celestial body revolving around the sun made the earth a planet; and this 
in turn demanded a new physics for a moving earth, with all the momentous 
consequences that such demand brought for the history of natural science. 
As may be seen, even this relatively simple case of redefinition had a 
tremendous transformative potential. 
The importance of the introduction of new concepts or the redefinition 
of old ones in a refocalization process cannot be overemphasized. This 
process, which might be dubbed reconceptualization, contributes to the 
establishment of a new platform from which to cast a fresh look at the whole 
controversy space. More often than not, also the past of the controversy 
space is rewritten in the light of the new perspective. However, the 
importance of reconceptualization in the evolution of controversy spaces 
does not provide any grounds to uphold the belief that the introduction of 
concepts is previous to the construction of the theory that includes them. As 
C. G. Hempel rightly pointed out, “Theory formation and concept 
formation go hand in hand; none of them can be performed successfully in 
isolation from the other” (Hempel 1965, p. 275). 
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C ON C L U D I N G  R EM A R K S  
 
Let us return to the two senses of “dialectic” distinguished before, namely, 
its ancient sense as controversial or adversarial dialogue, and the (modified) 
Hegelian sense as a form of development of a historical reality. Our concept 
of “controversy space” combines both senses. In the first sense, a 
controversy space is an agonistic arena in which parties confront with each 
other within a space which is structured in the way we have just described. 
As we have also mentioned, such confrontation may have positive or 
negative epistemic effects. In the case of the latter, controversy spaces 
remain stagnant or blocked, resulting in conceptual and epistemic sterility 
But in the former case, as the parties challenge each other, they may better 
articulate and refine their respective positions in response to objections and 
criticisms. Moreover, as has been remarked before, controversies may reveal 
hidden dimensions and implicit assumptions, thus opening up new 
directions for scientific or philosophical progress. 
In the second sense of “dialectic”, as a mode or pattern of historical 
development and change, controversy spaces are structures that are formed, 
may expand or extinguish, and can undergo transformations such as the one 
here called refocalization. Intellectual history suggests that this pattern is 
quite widespread. To be sure, science and philosophy have patterns of 
development and change that are exclusive to each other, but refocalization, 
as is shown by the cases studies included in this book, is common to both 
fields. 
Finally, let me emphasize that no universality claim for the model 
outlined in the preceding section is made, as usually is the case with models 
of scientific or philosophical change. Such claims often lead to the distortion 
of historical reality in order to make it fit the preferred model. Other 
possible patterns of change, differing from the pattern proposed here, such 
as the above mentioned complete substitution of a given controversy space 
by a new one, may be more adequate in some cases. However, recognizing 
the limits of this model does not prevent us from claiming that 
refocalization is a pattern that may be fruitfully applied in the 
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reconstruction of rather diverse historical cases of scientific and 
philosophical change. 
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